Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Case Digest
G. R. No. 148496 March 19. 2002
Facts: Petitioner Virgines Calvo. proprietor of Transorient Container Terminal Services. Inc. ( TCTSI ) . and a usage agent. entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation ( SMC ) for the transportation of 114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the port country to the Tabacalera Compound. Ermita. Manila. The lading was insured by respondent UCPB General Insurance Co. . Inc.
On July 14. 1990. contained in 30 metal new waves. arrived in Manila on board “M/V Hayakawa Maru” . After 24 hours. they were unloaded from vas to the detention of the arrastre operator. Manila Port Services. Inc. From July 23 to 25. 1990. suppliant. pursuant to her contract with SMC. withdrew the lading from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMC’s warehouse in Manila. On July 25. the goods were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors. reported that 15 reels of the semi-chemical fluting paper were “wet/stained/torn” and 3 reels of kraft line drive board were besides torn. The amendss cost P93. 112. 00.
SMC collected the said sum from respondent UCPB under its insurance contract. Respondent on the other manus. as a subrogee of SMC. brought a suit against suppliant in RTC. Makati City. On December 20. 1995. the RTC rendered judgement happening suppliant apt for the harm to the cargo. The determination was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or non Calvo is a common bearer?
Held: In this instance the contention of the suppliant. that he is non a common bearer but a private bearer. has no virtue.
Article 1732 makes no differentiation between one whose chief concern activity is the carrying of individuals or goods or both. and one who does such transporting merely as accessory activity. Article 1732 besides carefully avoids doing any differentiation between a individual or endeavor offering transit service on a regular or scheduled footing and one offering such service on an occasional. episodic or unscheduled footing. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a bearer offering its services to the “general populace. ” i. e. . the general community or population. and one who offers services or solicits concern merely from a narrow section of the general population. We think that Article 1733 intentionally refrained from doing such differentiation. ( De Guzman v. CA. 68 SCRA 612 )
Te construct of “common carrier” under Article 1732 coincide with the impression of “public service” . under the Public Service Act which partly supplements the jurisprudence on common bearer. Under Section 13. paragraph ( B ) of the Public Service Act. it includes:
“ x x x every individual that now or afterlife may have. operate. manage. or control in the Philippines. for hire or compensation. with general or limited patronage. whether lasting. occasional or inadvertent. and done for general concern intents. any common bearer. railway. street railroad. grip railroad. subway motor vehicle. either for cargo or rider. or both. with or without fixed path and whatever may be its categorization. cargo or bearer service of any category. express service. steamboat. or steamship line. pontines. ferries and H2O trade. engaged in the transit of riders or cargo or both. shipyard. marine fix store. pier or dock. ice works. ice-refrigeration works. canal. irrigation system. gas. electric visible radiation. heat and power. H2O supply and power crude oil. sewage system. wire or radio communications systems. wire or radio broadcast medium Stationss and other similar public services. ten ten x”
CENTRAL SHIPPING COMPANY vs INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA CENTRAL SHIPPING COMPANY. INC. . suppliant. vs. INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA. respondent. G. R. No. 150751 September 20. 2004
121 SCRA 769
Facts: On July 25. 1990 at Puerto Princesa. Palawan. the suppliant received on board its vas. the M/V Central Bohol. 376 pieces of Round Logs and undertook to transport said cargo to Manila for bringing to Alaska Lumber
Co. . Inc. The lading is insured for P3. 000. 000. 00 against entire lost under respondents MarineCargo Policy.
After lading the logs. the vas starts its ocean trip. After few hours of the trip. the ship tilts 10 grades to its side. due to the shifting of the logs in the clasp. It continues to lean doing the captain and the crew to abandon ship. The ship sank.
Respondent alleged that the loss is due to the carelessness and mistake of the captain. While suppliant contends that the occurrence is due to monsoons which is unanticipated or casa fortuito.
Issue: Whether or non suppliant is apt for the loss of lading?
Held: From the nature of their concern and for grounds of public policy. common bearers are bound to detect extraordinary diligence over the goods they transport. harmonizing to all the fortunes of each instance. In the event of loss. devastation or impairment of the insured goods. common bearers are responsible ; that is. unless they can turn out that such loss. devastation or impairment was brought about – among others – by “flood. storm. temblor. lightning or other natural catastrophe or catastrophe. ” In all other instances non specified under Article 1734 of the Civil Code. common bearers are presumed to hold been at mistake or to hold acted negligently. unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.
The contention of the suppliant that the loss is due to casa fortuito relieving them from liability is indefensible. Petitioner failed to demo that such natural catastrophe or catastrophe was the proximate and merely cause of the loss. Human bureau must be wholly excluded from the cause of hurt or loss. In other words. the detrimental effects blamed on the event or phenomenon must non hold been caused. contributed to. or worsened by the presence of human engagement. The defence of causeless event or natural catastrophe can non be successfully made when the hurt could hold been avoided by human safeguard. The monsoon is non the proximate cause of the sinking but is due to the improper stowage of logs. The logs were non secured by overseas telegram wires. doing the logs to switch and subsequently on the droping the ship. This shows that they did non exert extraordinary diligence. doing them apt for such loss.
Merchants INSURANCE COMPANY VS. ALEJANDRO Case Digest
Merchants INSURANCE COMPANY VS. ALEJANDRO
( 145 SCRA 42 )
Facts: Plaintiff Choa Tiek Seng filed a ailment against the suppliant before the so Court of First Instance of Manila for recovery of a amount of money under the marine insurance policy on lading. Mr. Choa alleged that the goods he insured with the suppliant sustained loss and harm in the sum of P35. 987. 26. The said goods were delivered to the arrastre operator E. Razon. Inc. . on December 17. 1976 and on the same day of the month were received by the consignee-plaintiff.
Petitioner disclaims liability and imputes against plaintiff the committee of fraud. A similar ailment was filed by Joseph Benzon Chua against the suppliant for recovery under the marine insurance policy for lading avering that the goods insured with the suppliant sustained loss and harm in the amount of P55. 996. 49. The goods were delivered to the plaintiff-consignee on or about January 25-28. 1977.
Petitioner filed third-party ailments against private respondents for insurance. subrogation. or reimbursement in the event that it is held apt to the complainant.
The private respondents. bearers Frota Oceanica Brasiliera and Australia-West Pacific Line alleged in their separate replies that the suppliant is already barred from registering a claim because under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. the suit against the bearer must be filed within one twelvemonth after bringing of the goods or the day of the month when the goods should hold been delivered
Petitioner contended that proviso relied upon by the respondents applies merely to the shipper and non to the insurance company of the goods.
Respondent justice dismissed both third-party ailments.
Issue: Whether or non the annual period within which to register a suit against the bearer and the ship. in instance of harm or loss as provided for in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act applies to the insurance company of the goods.
Held: The coverage of the Act includes the insurance company of the goods. Otherwise. what the Act intends to forbid after the oversight of the annual normative period can be done indirectly by the shipper or proprietor of the goods by merely registering a claim against the insurance company even after the oversight of one twelvemonth. This would be the consequence if we follow the petitioner’s statement that the insurance company can. at any clip. continue against the bearer and the ship since it is non bound by the time-bar proviso. In this state of affairs. the annual restriction will be practically useless. This could non hold been the purpose of the jurisprudence which has besides for its intent the protection of the bearer and the ship from deceitful claims by holding “matters impacting transit of goods by sea be decided in every bit short a clip as possible” and by avoiding incidents which would “unnecessarily widen the period and license holds in the colony of inquiries impacting the transit. “
In the instance at saloon. the petitioner’s action has prescribed under the commissariats of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Hence. whether it files a third-party ailment or chooses to keep an independent action against herein respondents is of no minute. CASE DIGEST ( Transportation Law ) : Monarch Insurance Co. . Inc. vs. CA MONARCH INSURANCE CO. . INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION G. R. No. 92735. June 8. 2000
Monarch and Tabacalera are insurance bearers of lost ladings. They indemnified the shippers and were accordingly subrogated to their rights. involvements and actions against Aboitiz. the lading bearer. Because Aboitiz refused to counterbalance Monarch. it filed two ailments against Aboitiz which were consolidated and jointly tried.
Aboitiz rejected duty for the claims on the land that the sinking of its lading vas was due to coerce majeure or an act of God. Aboitiz was later declared as in default and allowed Monarch and Tabacalera to show grounds ex-parte.
Whether or non the philosophy of limited liability applies in the instant instance.
The failure of Aboitiz to show sufficient grounds to acquit itself from mistake and/or carelessness in the sinking of its vas in the face of the foregoing expert testimony constrains us to keep that Aboitiz was at the same time at mistake and/or negligent with the ship captain and crew of the M/V P. Aboitiz. [ This is in conformity with the regulation that in instances affecting the limited liability of shipowners. the initial load of cogent evidence of carelessness or unseaworthiness remainders on the claimants. However. once the vas proprietor or any party asserts the right to restrict its liability. the load of cogent evidence as to miss of privity or cognition on its portion with regard to the affair of carelessness or unseaworthiness is shifted to it. This load. Aboitiz had unluckily failed to discharge. ]
That Aboitiz failed to dispatch the load of turn outing that the unseaworthiness of its vas was non due to its mistake and/or carelessness should non nevertheless intend that the limited liability regulation will non be applied to the present instances. The curious fortunes here demand that there should be no rigorous attachment to procedural regulations on grounds lest the merely claims of shippers/insurers be frustrated. The regulation on limited liability should be applied in conformity with the latest opinion in Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation. Ltd. . ] promulgated on January 21. 1993. that claimants be treated as “creditors in an insolvent corporation whose assets are non plenty to fulfill the entirety of claims against it. “
Constantino V Asia Life Insurance Company
on November 15. 2011
Insurance Code – Parties to an Insurance Contract – Insurance Contract in Times of War There are two instances consolidated here. First is that of Constantino who acquired a life insurance from Asia Life in September 1941. He paid the first premium which was good until September 1942. War broke out and he was non able to pay the 2nd and subsequent premiums. He died in 1944. The 2nd instance was that of Tomas Ruiz who acquired his life insurance from Asia Life in August 1938. He has been paying his premium sacredly but due to the war. he was non able to pay his subsequent premiums in 1942. He died in 1945. The donees from both insurance policies filed their claims when the war is over.
They point out that the duty of the insured to pay premiums was excused ( suspended ) during the war owing to impossibleness of public presentation. and that accordingly no unfavourable effects should follow from such failure ( New York Rule ) . Asia Life argued that the default of premiums cancelled the insurance policy. An insurance contract is one in which clip is material and of the kernel. Non-payment at the twenty-four hours involves absolute forfeiture if such be the footings of the contract ( United States Rule ) Issue: Whether or non the donees are entitled to the claims. HELD: No. The Supreme Court adopts the United States Rule. It should be noted that the parties contracted non merely for peacetime conditions but besides for times of war. because the policies contained commissariats applicable expressly to wartime yearss. The logical illation. therefore. is that the parties contemplated uninterrupted operation of the contract even if armed struggle should result.
Sun Insurance V Asuncion Digest
G. R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13. 1989
Petitioner Sun Insurance ( or SIOL ) files a ailment for the revocation of a determination on the consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently. the Private Respondent ( PR ) files a ailment for the refund of premiums and the issue of a writ of preliminary fond regard in a civil instance against SIOL. In add-on. PR besides claims for amendss. attorney’s fees. judicial proceeding costs. etc. . nevertheless. the supplication did non province the sum of amendss sought although from the organic structure of the ailment it can be inferred to be in sum of P 50 million.
Hence. PR originally paid merely PhP 210. 00 in docket fees. The ailment underwent a figure of amendments to do manner for subsequent re-assessments of the sum of amendss sought every bit good as the matching docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to stay by the regulations by paying the extra docket fees as required.
Issue: Did the Court get legal power over the instance even if private respondent did non pay the correct or sufficient docket fees?
It was held that it is non merely the filing of the ailment or appropriate initiatory pleading. but the payment of the prescribed docket fee. that vests a test tribunal with legal power over the capable affair or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is non accompanied by payment of the docket fee. the tribunal may let payment of the fee within a sensible clip but in no instance beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same regulation goes for permissive counterclaims. 3rd party claims and similar pleadings.
In herein instance. evidently. there was the purpose on the portion of PR to victimize the authorities of the docket fee due non merely in the filing of the original ailment but besides in the filing of the 2nd amended ailment. However. a more broad reading of the regulations is called for sing that. unlike in Manchester. the private respondent demonstrated his willingness to stay by the regulations by paying the extra docket fees as required.
Where a test tribunal acquires legal power in similar mode. but later. the judgement awards a claim non specified in the pleading. or if specified the same has been left for finding by the tribunal. the extra filing fee shall represent a lien on the judgement. It shall be the duty of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to implement said lien and buttocks and roll up the extra fee.
Evangelista v. Alto Surety
In 1949. Santos Evangelista instituted Civil Case No. 8235 of the CFI Manila ( Santos Evangelista vs. Ricardo Rivera ) for a amount of money. On the same day of the month. he obtained a writ of fond regard. which was levied upon a house. built by Rivera on a land situated in Manila and leased to him. by registering transcript of said writ and the corresponding notice of fond regard with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila. In due class. judgement was rendered in favour of Evangelista. who bought the house at public auction held in conformity with the writ of executing issued in said instance on 8 October 1951. The corresponding definite title of sale was issued to him on 22 October 1952. upon termination of the period of salvation.
When Evangelista sought to take ownership of the house. Rivera refused to give up it. upon the land that he had leased the belongings from the Alto Surety & A ; Insurance Co. . Inc. and that the latter is now the true proprietor of said belongings. It appears that on 10 May 1952. a definite title of sale of the same house had been issued to Alto Surety. as the highest bidder at an auction sale held. on 29 September 1950. in conformity with a writ of executing issued in Civil Case 6268 of the same tribunal ( Alto Surety & A ; Insurance vs. Maximo Quiambao. Rosario Guevara and Ricardo Rivera ) ” in which judgement for the amount of money. had been rendered in favour of Alto Surety. Hence. on 13 June 1953. Evangelista instituted an action against Alto Surety and Ricardo Rivera. for the intent of set uping his rubric over said house. and procuring ownership thereof. apart from retrieving amendss.
After due test. the CFI Manila rendered judgement for Evangelista. condemning Rivera and Alto Surety to present the house in inquiry to Evangelista and to pay him. jointly and independently. P40. 00 a month from October 1952. until said bringing. The determination was nevertheless reversed by the Court of Appeals. which absolved Alto Surety from the ailment on history that although the writ of fond regard in favour of Evangelista had been filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila prior to the sale in favour of Alto Surety. Evangelista did non get thereby a discriminatory lien. the fond regard holding been levied as if the house in inquiry were immoveable belongings.
Whether or non a house constructed by the leaseholder of the land on which it is
built. should be dealt with. for intent of fond regard. as immoveable belongings?
The tribunal ruled that the house is non personal belongings. much less a debt. recognition or other personal belongings non capable of manual bringing. but immoveable belongings. As held in Laddera vs. Hodges ( 48 OG 5374 ) . “a true edifice is immoveable or existent belongings. whether it is erected by the proprietor of the land or by a usufructuary or leaseholder. ” The sentiment that the house of Rivera should hold been attached. as “personal belongings capable of manual bringing. by taking and safely maintaining in his custody” . for it declared that “Evangelista could non hold validly purchased Ricardo Rivera’s house from the sheriff as the latter was non in ownership thereof at the clip he sold it at a public auction” is indefensible. Parties to a title of movable mortgage may hold to see a house as personal belongings for intents of said contract.
However. this position is good merely in so far as the catching parties are concerned. It is based. partially. upon the rule of estoppel. Neither this rule. nor said position. is applicable to aliens to said contract. The regulations on executing do non let. and should non be interpreted as to let. the particular consideration that parties to a contract may hold desired to leave to existent estate as personal belongings. when they are non normally so. Gross saless on executing affect the populace and 3rd individuals. The ordinance regulating gross revenues on executing are for public functionaries to follow. The signifier of proceedings prescribed for each sort of belongings is suited to its character. non to the character which the parties have given to it or want to give it. The ordinances were ne’er intended to accommodate the consideration that parties. may hold in private given to the belongings levied upon.
The tribunal therefore affirms the determination of the CA with cost against Alto Surety. White Gold Marine Service Inc. vs. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Co. Post under instance digests. Commercial Law at Tuesday. February 21. 2012 Facts: Petitioner White Gold bought a protection and insurance coverage for its ships from Steamship Mutual through Respondent Pioneer. Certificates and grosss therefore were given. However. Petitioner failed to carry through its payments therefore Steamship refused to regenerate its coverage. Steamship so filed for aggregation against Petitioner for recovery of unpaid balance. Thereafter. Petitioner besides filed a ailment against Steamship and Respondent before theInsurance Commission for misdemeanors ( 186. 187 for Steamship and 299. 300. 301 in relation to 302 and 303 for Respondent ) of the Insurance Code-license demands as an Insurance company for the former and as insurance agent for the latter. Said committee dismissed the ailment which determination was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or non Steamship Mutual is a Protection and Indemnity Club engaged in the insurance concern in the Philippines
Held: Steamship Mutual as a P & A ; I Club is a common insurance company engaged in the marine insurance concern.
An insurance contract is a contract of insurance. This means that one party undertakes for a consideration to indemnify another party against loss. harm. or liability originating from an unknown or contingent event. While to find if a contract is an insurance contract we can look at the nature of the promise. the act to be performed. exact nature of the understanding in position of the full happening. eventuality or circumstance where the public presentation is mandated. The label is non commanding.
While under Section 2 ( 2 ) of the Insurance Code the phrase “doing an insurance business” constitutes the followers: 1 ) devising or proposing to do. as insurance company. any insurance contract ; 2 ) devising or proposing to do. as surety. any contract of suretyship as a career and non as simply incidental to any other legitimate concern or activity of the surety ; 3 ) making any sort of concern. including a reinsurance concern. specifically recognized as representing the making of an insurance concern within the significance of this codification ; 4 ) making or suggesting to make any concern in substance to any of the foregoing in a mode designed to hedge the proviso of this codification.
Taking all of these in to consideration. Steamship Mutual engaged inmarine insurance concern undertook to indemnify Petitioner White Gold against marine losingss as enumerated under sec. 99 of the Insurance Code. It is immaterial whether net income is derived from makinginsurance contract and that no separate or direct consideration is received since these does non prevent the being of an insurance concern.
Insurance concern without a licence or a certification of authorization from the Insurance Commission. On the 2nd issue. Pioneer is the resident agent of Steamship Mutual as evidenced by the certification of enrollment issued by the Insurance Commission. Ithas been licensed to make or transact insurancebusiness by virtuousness of the certification of authorization issuedby the same bureau. However. a Certification fromthe Commission provinces that Pioneer does non hold aseparate licence to be an agent/broker of SteamshipMutual. Although Pioneer is already licensed as aninsurance company. it needs a separate licence to actas insurance agent for Steamship Mutual.
PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION VS. CHEMOIL LIGHTERAGE HITE GOLD CORPORATIONG. R. No. 136888. June 29. 2005 Facts: Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the concern of non-life insurance. Respondent Chemoil Lighterage Corporation is besides adomestic corporation engaged in the conveyance of goods. On24 January 1991. Samkyung Chemical Company. Ltd. . basedin South Korea. shipped 62. 06 metric dozenss of the liquidchemical DIOCTYL PHTHALATE ( DOP ) on board MT“TACHIBANA” which was valued at US $ 90. 201. 57 andanother 436. 70 metric dozenss of DOP valued at US $ 634. 724. 89to the Philippines. The consignee was Plastic Group Phils. . Inc. in Manila. PGP insured the lading with Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation against all hazards. The insurance wasunder Marine Policies No. MRN-30721 [ 5 ] dated 06 February1991.
Marine Endorsement No. 2786 [ 7 ] dated 11 May 1991was attached and formed portion of MRN-30721. amending thelatter’s insured value to P24. 667. 422. 03. and decreased thepremium consequently. The ocean oiler MT “TACHIBANA”unloaded the lading to the oiler flatboat. which shall transportthe same to Del Pan Bridge in Pasig River and hale it by landto PGP’s storage armored combat vehicles in Calamba. Laguna. Upon inspectionby PGP. the samples taken from the shipment showeddiscoloration showing that it was damaged. PGP thensent a missive where it officially made an insurance claim for theloss it sustained. Petitioner requested the GIT Insurance Adjusters. Inc. ( GIT ) . to carry on a Measure and Condition Survey of the shipmentwhich issued a study saying that DOP samples taken
werediscolored. Inspection of lading armored combat vehicles showed manhole coversof ballast tanks’ ceilings slackly secured and that the rubber gaskets of the manhole screens of the ballast armored combat vehicles re-acted tothe chemical doing shrinking therefore. loosening the coversand lading immersion.
Petitioner paid PGP the full and finalpayment for the loss and issued a Subrogation Receipt. Meanwhile. PGP paid the respondent the as full payment for the latter’s services. On 15 July 1991. an action for damageswas instituted by the petitioner-insurer against respondent-carrier before the RTC. Br. 16. City of Manila. Respondentfiled an reply which admitted that it undertook to transportthe cargo. but alleged that before the DOP was loadedinto its flatboat. the representative of PGP. AdjustmentStandard Corporation. inspected it and found the same clean. dry. and fit for lading. therefore accepted the lading without anyprotest or notice. As bearer. no mistake and carelessness can beattributed against respondent as it exercised extraordinarydiligence in managing the lading. After due hearing. the trialcourt rendered a Decision in favour of complainant. On entreaty. theCourt of Appeals promulgated its Decision change by reversaling the trialcourt. A request for reappraisal on certiorar [ was filed by thepetitioner with this Court.
Issues:1. Whether or non the Notice of Claim was filed within therequired period. 2. Whether or non the harm to the lading was due to the faultor carelessness of the respondent.
Held: Article 366 of the Code of Commerce has profoundapplication in the instance at saloon. which provides that ; “Withintwenty-four hours following the reception of the ware aclaim may be made against the bearer on history of damageor norm found upon opening the bundles. provided thatthe indicants of the harm or norm giving rise to theclaim can non be ascertained from the outside of saidpackages. in which instance said claim shall merely be admitted atthe clip of the reception of the bundles. ” After the periodsmentioned have elapsed. or after the transit chargeshave been paid. no claim whatsoever shall be admittedagainst the bearer with respect to the status in which thegoods transported were delivered.
As to the first issue. the suppliant contends that the notice of taint was given by PGP employee. to Ms. Abastillas. at the clip of the bringing of the lading. and hence. withinthe needed period. The respondent. nevertheless. claims that thesupposed notice given by PGP over the telephone wasdenied by Ms. Abastillas. The Court of Appeals declared: thata telephone call made to defendant-company could constitutesubstantial conformity with the demand of notice. However. it must be pointed out that conformity with theperiod for registering notice is an indispensable portion of the demand. i. e. . instantly if the harm is evident. or otherwisewithin 24 hours from reception of the goods. the clear import being that prompt scrutiny of the goods must bemade to determine harm if this is non instantly evident. We have examined the grounds. and We are unable to happen
COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORP. VS. LIANGA BAY & A ; COMMUNITY MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE. INC. G. R. No. 136914. January 25. 2002
Facts: State Banker’s Insurance Corp. ( CBIC ) insured the edifice of respondent Lianga Bay and Community Multi-Purpose Corp. . Inc. against fire. loss. harm. or liability during the period get downing June 20. 1990 for the amount of Php. 200. 000. 00. On July 1. 1989 at approximately 12:40 in the forenoon a fire occurred. The respondent filed the insurance claim but the request denied the same on the land that the edifice was set on fire by two NPA Rebels and that such loss was an excepted hazard under par. 6 of the conditions of the insurance policy that the insurance does non cover any loss or harm occasioned by among others. mutiny. public violence. military or any uprising. Respondent filed an action for recovery of loss. harm or liability against suppliant and the Trial Court ordered the request to pay the full value of the insurance.
Issue: Whether or non the insurance corporation is exempted to pay based on the exclusion clause in the insurance policy.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the insurance corporation has the load of cogent evidence to demo that the loss comes within the horizon of the exclusion or restriction set-up. But the insurance corporation can non utilize a informant to turn out that the fire was caused by the NPA Rebels on the footing that the informant learned this from others. Such testimony is considered rumors and may non be received as cogent evidence of the truth of what he has learned. The suppliant. neglecting to turn out the exclusion. can non trust upon on freedom or exclusion clause in the fire insurance policy. The request was granted MALAYAN INSURANCE CO. . VS. PHIL. NAILS & A ; WIRES CORP.
G. R. No. 138084. April 10. 2002
Facts: Respondent Phil. Nails & A ; Wires Corp. insured against all hazard its cargo of 10. 053. 40 metric dozenss of steel note with suppliant Malayan Insurance Co. . Inc. . the cargo delivered was short by 377. 168 metric dozenss. For this deficit. respondent claimed insurance for Php. 5. 250. 000. 00. Petitioner refused to pay. On July 28. 1993. respondent filed a ailment against suppliant for the Sum of money with RTC of Pasig. Petitioner moved to disregard for failure to province cause of action but it was denied. On November 4. 1994. respondent moved to declare suppliant in default and the test tribunal granted and allowed the presentation of grounds ex parte. Respondent presented its lone informant. Jeanne King. On November 11. 1993. suppliant filed its reply but was expunged from the record for late filing. The Trial Court rendered a judgement by default.
Issue: Whether or non there is a cause of action and whether or non King is believable informant.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent’s cause of action is founded on breach of insurance. To keep suppliant apt. respondent has to turn out. foremost. its. its importing of 10. 053. 40 metric dozenss of steel notes and 2nd. the existent steel notes delivered to and received by the respondent. Witness Jeanne King has personal cognition of the goods imported steel notes received. Her testimony on steel notes received was rumor because she based the drumhead merely on the grosss prepared by the other individual. CONCEALMENT MADE IN GOOD FAITH ; VALID INSURACE CONTRACT
PHILAMCARE HEALTH SYSTEMS. INC. VS. CA & A ; JULITA RAMOS
G. R. No. 125678. March 18. 2002
Facts: Ernani Trinos. asleep hubby of Julita Ramos. applied for a wellness attention coverage with the suppliant Philamcare. In the standard application signifier. he delivered no to a inquiry inquiring him if he had been treated of any of the household member consulted for high blood. bosom problem. diabetes. malignant neoplastic disease. liver disease. asthma or ulcer. The application was approved for a period of 1 twelvemonth from and therefore extended to June 1. 1990. During the period of coverage. Ernani suffered a bosom onslaught and was confined for one month. Respondent Julita Ramos tried to claim stating that the wellness attention Agreement was void as there was privacy sing Ernani’s medical history. On July 24. 1990. after Ernani died. Julita Ramos instituted an action for amendss against Philam attention with the RTC Manila. which ruled against the latter.
Issue: Whether or non there is a valid insurance contract because of alleged privacy of stuff fact.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that there is a valid insurance contract. after all. all the elements for an insurance contract are contract are present and alleged privacy replies made in good religion and without purpose to lead on will non avoid the policy. The insurance company. in instance of stuff fact. is non justified in trusting upon such statement. but obligated to do farther enquiry. PAYMENT BY INSURANCE COMPANY OF INSURABLE VALUE OF THE GOODS ; INSURANCE COMPANY SUBROGATED TO THE RIGHTS OF THE ASSURED AGAINST THE COMMON CARRIER
DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES. INC. VS. CA ET. AL.
G. R. No. 127897. November 15. 2001
Facts: Caltex Phil. entered into a contract of affreightment with the suppliant. Delsan Transport Lines. Inc. for a period of one twelvemonth whereby the suppliant agreed to transport Caltex industrial fuel oil from Batangas refinery to different parts of the state. On August 14. 1986. MT Maysun set canvas for Zamboanga City but unluckily the vas in the early forenoon of August 16. 1986 near Panay Gulf. The cargo was insured with the private respondent. American Home Assurance Corporation. Subsequently. private respondent paid Caltex the amount of Php. 5. 096. 635. 57. Exerting its right of subrogation under Art. 2207. NCC. the private respondent demanded from the suppliant the same sum paid to Caltex. Due to its failure to roll up from the suppliant. private respondent filed a ailment with the RTC of Makati City but the test tribunal dismissed the ailment. happening the vas to be seaworthy and that the incident was due to a force majeure. therefore relieving the suppliant from liability. However. the determination of the test tribunal was reversed by the CA. giving acceptance to the study of PAGASA that the conditions was normal and that it was impossible for the vas to drop.
Issue: Whether or non the payment made by private respondent for the insured value of the lost lading amounted to an admittance that the vas was seaworthy. therefore preventing any action for recovery against the suppliant.
Held: The payment by the private respondent for the insured value of the lost lading operates as release of its right to implement the term of the implied guarantee against Caltex under the marine insurance policy. However. the same can non be validly interpreted as an automatic admittance of the vessel’s fitness by the private respondent as to prevent resort against the suppliant for any liability under its contractual duty as common bearer. The fact of payment grants the private respondent subrogatory right which enables it to exert legal redresss that otherwise be available to Caltex as proprietor of the lost lading against the suppliant common bearer. Calanoc v. CAG. R. No. L-8151 December 16. 1955J. Bautista Angelo Doctrine: In instance of ambiguity in an insurance contract covering inadvertent decease. the Supreme Courtheld that such footings shall be construed purely against the insurance company and liberally in favour of the insured inorder to consequence the intent of insurance.
Facts: Melencio Basilio. a watcher of the Manila Auto Supply. secured a life insurance policy from the Filipino American Insurance Company in the sum of P2. 000 to which was attached a auxiliary contract covering decease by accident. He subsequently died from a gunfire lesion on the juncture of a robbery committed ; later. his widow was paid P2. 000 stand foring the face value of the policy. The widow demanded the payment of the extra amount of P2. 000 stand foring the value of the supplemental policy which the company refused because the asleep died by slaying during the robbery and while doing an apprehension as an officer of the jurisprudence which were expressly excluded in the contract. The company’s contention which was upheld by the Court of Appeals provides that the fortunes environing Basilio’s decease was caused by one of the hazards excluded by the auxiliary contract which exempts the company from liability.
Issue: Is the Filipino American Life Insurance Co. apt to the suppliant for the sum covered by thesupplemental contract?
The fortunes of Basilio’s decease can non be taken as strictly knowing on the portion of Basilio to expose himself to the danger. There is no cogent evidence that his decease was the consequence of knowing violent death because there is the possibility that the criminal had fired the shooting simply to frighten away the people around. In this instance. the company’s defence points out that Basilio’s is included among the hazards excluded in the auxiliary contract ; nevertheless. the footings and wording of the exclusion clause should be clearly expressed within the apprehension of the insured. Art. 1377 of the New Civil Code provides that in instance ambiguity. uncertainness or obscureness in the reading of the footings of the contract. it shall be construed against the party who caused such obscureness.
Using this to the state of affairs. the equivocal or vague footings in the insurance policy are to be construed purely against the insurance company and liberally in favour of the insured party. The ground is to guarantee the protection of the insured since these insurance contracts are normally arranged and employed by experts and legal advisors moving entirely in the involvement of the insurance company. Equally long as insurance companies insist upon the usage of equivocal. intricate and proficient commissariats. which conceal their ain purposes. the tribunals must. in equity to those who purchase insurance. construe every ambiguity in favour of the insured.
PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS. INC vs. CA and CAYAS
G. R. No. 78860
May 28. 1990
Fact: Cayas was the registered proprietor of a Mazda coach which was insured with suppliant PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS. INC ( PCSI ) . The coach figured in an accident in Cavite. wounding several of its riders. One of them. Perea. sued Cayas for amendss in the CFI. while three others agreed to a colony of P4. 000. 00 each with Cayas. After test. the tribunal rendered a determination in favour of Perea. Cayas ordered to counterbalance the latter with amendss. Cayas filed a ailment with the CFI. seeking reimbursement from PCSI for the sums she paid to ALL victims. avering that the latter refused to do such reimbursement notwithstanding the fact that her claim was within its contractual liability under the insurance policy.
The determination of the CA affirmed in toto the determination of the RTC of Cavite. the dispositive part of which provinces: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. judgement is herewith rendered telling suspect PCSI to pay complainant Cayas the amount of P50. 000. 00 under its maximal liability as provided for in the insurance policy ; … In this request for reappraisal on certiorari. suppliant seeks to restrict its liability merely to the payment made by private respondent to Perea and merely up to the sum of P12. 000. 00. It wholly denies liability for the payments made by private respondents to the other 3 injured riders numbering P12. 000. 00. Issue: how much should PCSI wage?
HELD: The determination of the CA is modified. suppliant merely to pay Cayas P12. 000. 000. 00
The insurance policy provides:
5. No admittance. offer. promise or payment shall be made by or on behalf of the insured without the written consent of the Company …
It being specifically required that petitioner’s written consent be foremost secured before any payment in colony of any claim could be made. private respondent is precluded from seeking reimbursement of the payments made to the other 3 victims in position of her failure to follow with the status contained in the insurance policy.
Besides. the insurance policy involved explicitly bounds petitioner’s liability to P12. 000. 00 per individual and to P50. 000. 00 per accident
Clearly. the cardinal rule that contracts are respected as the jurisprudence between the undertaking parties finds application in the present instance. Therefore. it was error on the portion of the test and appellant tribunals to hold disregarded the judicial admissions of the parties and to hold substituted their ain reading of the insurance policy.
We observe that although Cayas was able to turn out a entire loss of lone P44. 000. 00. suppliant was made apt for the sum of P50. 000. 00. the maximal liability per accident stipulated in the policy. This is patent mistake. An insurance insurance. being simply an aid or damages in so far as can be reasonably ascertained. can non be availed of by any accident victim or claimant as an instrument of enrichment by ground of an accident.